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Report on the Latin American economy. Second half of 2009
During the fi rst half of 2009, economic developments in Latin America followed a very similar 
pattern to that of the world economy. As a result of the impact of the international fi nancial 
crisis and the abrupt fall in world demand, there was a sharp decline in Q1, on a similar scale 
to that in 2008 Q4, and a slight quarter-on-quarter recovery in Q2. In year-on-year terms, 
GDP for the region as a whole contracted by 2.8% in Q1, followed by a fall of 3.9% in Q2 (see 
Table 1).
Seen in perspective, it has been the most marked contraction in activity in the region in the 
past three decades, exceeding that recorded in 2002 Q1, and similar to the fall in 1983, with 
the external debt crisis. Indeed, only in 1932, during the Great Depression, can a more pro-
nounced decline in GDP (-4.7%) than that observed in the fi rst half of 2009 be found (see 
Chart 1). Yet despite its intensity, the real adjustment in Latin America has not had particularly 
severe and lasting consequences in terms of fi nancial instability as were seen on other occa-
sions, which attests to the reduction in vulnerabilities in recent years and the soundness of the 
starting position of these economies. This relative solidity in the face of the current crisis dis-
tinguishes Latin America from other emerging regions - in particular from some Eastern Euro-
pean countries - and augurs a brighter outlook about the region’s capacity for recovery. In this 
respect, although the signs of recovery are less generalised than those observed in emerging 
Asia, the higher-frequency indicators have shown signs of stabilisation that would suggest that 
the trough of the cycle was reached in Q2.
Infl ation eased signifi cantly in all the countries, resuming a year-on-year rate of 5.9% in Sep-
tember for the region as a whole. That means the highs reached in late 2008 have been con-
tained, albeit to a lesser extent than seen in other advanced and emerging economies. Against 
this background, the region’s fi nancial markets have behaved favourably since March, which 
might be attributed not only to positive developments on international markets, but also to the 
lesser impact of the crisis on Latin American fi nancial systems. Growth projections for 2010 
have begun to be revised upwards, following an entire year of downward revisions.
It is worth asking to what extent the recovery that is beginning to be discernible in Latin 
America may be self-sustained, or whether it depends on improvements in the external envi-
ronment or on economic policies applied to shore up domestic demand. In the fi rst two quar-
ters of the year, external demand alone contributed positively to growth, as a result of the fact 
that the decline in imports exceeded that in exports. In terms of its year-on-year rate, the con-
tribution of domestic demand was very negative, although in quarter-on-quarter terms it be-
haved relatively better in past months in certain countries (Brazil). In this setting, the recovery 
is likely to continue depending on the economic policies applied (whereby the withdrawal of 
the stimuli should be gradual), but, to a greater extent, on the external environment improving. 
In this respect, the recent pick-up in trade and fi nancial fl ows, the rise in commodities prices 
and the start of the stockbuilding cycle at the global level should provide some support to the 
recovery. As to economic policies, monetary policy in Latin America has arguably played a 
predominant role in responding to the crisis, although it has not been necessary to resort to 
the non-conventional instruments deployed in the industrialised countries, as analysed in Box 
1. Conversely, fi scal policy has played a more limited role (with the exception of Chile), because 
the starting conditions offered little room for manoeuvre and, also, because a lesser or slower 
degree of implementation than that foreseen in the initially announced plans was apparent in 
several countries.
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Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
GDP (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.6 5.7 4.1 5.7 6.3 5.2 5.6 5.1 0.9 -2.8 -3.9
Argentina 8.5 8.7 7.0 8.8 9.1 8.5 7.8 6.9 4.1 2.0 -0.8
Brazil 3.7 5.4 5.1 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.8 1.3 -1.8 -1.2
Mexico 4.9 3.2 1.3 3.4 4.2 2.6 2.9 1.7 -1.6 -8.0 -10.3
Chile 4.6 4.7 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.4 4.6 4.6 0.2 -2.3 -4.5
Colombia 6.9 7.5 2.5 6.5 8.0 4.2 3.7 3.3 -1.0 -0.4 -0.5
Venezuela 10.3 8.4 4.8 8.6 8.5 5.0 7.3 4.1 3.2 0.3 -2.4
Peru 7.6 9.0 9.8 8.9 9.8 10.3 11.8 10.9 6.5 1.8 -1.1
Uruguay 7.0 7.8 12.1 9.6 9.5 9.8 16.0 13.2 9.5 2.3 0.2
CPI (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.2 5.4 7.9 5.4 5.9 6.6 7.7 8.5 8.5 7.7 6.8 5.9
Argentina 10.9 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.5 9.1 8.9 7.8 6.6 5.5 6.2
Brazil 4.2 3.6 5.7 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.6 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.3
Mexico 3.6 4.0 5.1 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.0 4.9
Chile 3.4 4.4 8.7 4.8 7.2 8.0 8.9 9.3 8.6 5.6 3.1 -1.1
Colombia 4.3 5.5 7.0 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.4 7.7 7.8 6.6 4.8 3.2
Venezuela 13.6 18.8 31.4 16.2 20.0 26.3 31.0 34.6 33.4 29.5 28.2 28.9
Peru 2.0 1.8 5.8 2.4 3.5 4.8 5.5 6.1 6.6 5.6 4.0 1.2
Uruguay 6.4 8.1 7.9 8.7 8.6 7.7 7.6 7.6 8.6 8.2 6.7 6.9
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (c) -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.6 -2.1
Argentina 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.0
Brazil -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -2.2 -2.2 -1.6 -2.2 -1.8 -2.1 -2.9 -3.3
Mexico 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.4 -1.7
Chile 8.0 8.7 5.0 8.7 8.7 9.2 7.2 6.1 5.0 1.4 -1.4
Colombia -3.7 -3.3 -1.7 -2.4 -2.8 -2.2 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 -2.7 -3.0
Venezuela 0.0 3.0 -1.2 0.9 3.0 3.4 1.7 0.9 -1.2 -2.2 —
Peru 1.4 1.1 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.1 2.1 2.2 1.3 -0.1
Uruguay -0.6 -0.3 -1.5 1.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.9 -0.3 — —
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (c) 39.1 33.7 29.9 33.9 33.7 31.7 31.6 30.4 31.0 32.1 34.8
Argentina 64.2 55.5 44.6 55.8 55.5 52.4 50.4 45.8 44.7 41.9 44.2
Brazil 44.7 42.7 35.8 43.2 42.7 40.8 41.8 40.0 38.8 40.6 43.2
Mexico 23.2 21.1 24.5 21.2 21.1 21.0 20.7 20.8 24.5 25.5 26.8
Chile 5.3 4.1 5.2 4.4 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.1 5.0
Colombia 44.8 32.9 33.4 35.6 32.9 32.6 32.6 32.8 33.4 36.9 35.3
Venezuela 41.9 22.7 13.5 21.2 22.7 20.9 13.6 12.6 13.2 11.5 —
Peru 32.7 29.7 24.1 31.4 29.7 27.6 25.3 23.9 24.1 24.5 26.1
Uruguay 68.4 67.2 51.2 68.7 67.1 65.4 62.2 56.2 51.0 52.8 53.4
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 2.0 0.8 -0.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.4 -0.7 -0.7
Argentina 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.1 3.3
Brazil 1.3 0.1 -1.8 0.6 0.1 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -1.8 -1.5 -1.2
Mexico -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.4 -1.6 -1.5
Chile 4.7 4.4 -2.0 5.0 4.4 3.1 1.9 0.0 -2.0 -2.9 -2.4
Colombia -1.8 -2.8 -2.8 -3.0 -2.9 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 -2.7 -2.7 -2.6
Venezuela 14.7 8.8 14.3 8.8 8.8 11.5 13.4 16.4 12.3 7.6 3.4
Peru 3.0 1.4 -3.3 2.1 1.4 0.3 -1.2 -2.2 -3.3 -3.0 -1.7
Uruguay -2.0 -0.3 -3.9 -1.1 -1.0 -0.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.8 -3.0 -0.9
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 22.1 20.1 17.8 22.4 21.6 19.9 19.0 18.2 17.8 19.2 20.0
Argentina 51.1 47.8 38.2 49.2 47.6 46.6 44.6 40.6 39.2 39.1 38.7
Brazil 15.8 14.5 12.6 15.9 14.7 14.1 13.3 12.8 12.4 12.7 18.2
Mexico 12.3 12.1 11.5 11.5 11.0 12.1 11.6 11.3 11.4 14.8 15.8
Chile 32.4 34.0 38.3 33.9 34.0 33.4 35.1 37.5 37.6 40.8 42.7
Colombia 29.5 21.6 19.1 25.3 25.9 18.9 19.0 19.0 18.8 19.1 21.1
Venezuela 33.7 24.4 18.2 24.1 24.4 22.7 20.2 18.5 19.6 17.4 17.4
Peru 31.0 26.4 27.1 29.7 29.8 30.1 28.2 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.8
Uruguay 52.6 50.3 37.2 55.2 52.8 47.7 43.6 39.4 37.0 37.4 38.3
2008 2009
2006 2007 2008
2007
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
SOURCE: National statistics.
a. Aggregate of eight represented countries, except Uruguay.
b. Four-quarter moving average.
c. Excluding Venezuela.
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In these circumstances, the outlook for the Latin American economies is less negative than six 
months ago, when the previous half-yearly report was published. However, as for the rest of 
the world economy, the outlook remains shrouded in notable uncertainty looking ahead. In 
particular, the possible entrenchment of lower potential growth rates in the United States, a 
key trade and fi nancial partner, is a factor of concern for the region given the consequences 
this would have on developments in some countries - especially the Central American econo-
mies - in the coming years. The crisis may also have left its mark on the formerly sound funda-
mentals of some economies. In particular, there has been a weakening in public fi nances and 
a particularly marked deterioration in the labour market in some countries, and lagged effects 
of the crisis on fi nancial systems should not be ruled out in a setting of foreseeable rises in 
default rates. There has also been a rise in poverty, after nine years of uninterrupted declines. 
On the contrary, expectations that world growth may be led by countries such as China, 
whose demand for commodities is most sizeable, would be an important source of support to 
the countries in the region that are exporters of these products. Finally, the risk of a prolonged 
contraction in capital fl ows towards Latin America has fallen most signifi cantly, and fi nancing 
conditions and confi dence are recovering more quickly than envisaged, which might give 
some momentum to growth.
GDP AND TERMS OF TRADE
Year-on-year rate and index
CHART 1
SOURCES: Oxford Latin American Economic History Database, Consensus Forecast, Datastream, 
World Bank  and Economist Intelligence Unit.
a. Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b. Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts.
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Following the global recession that characterised 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, the world economy 
began to show signs of picking up in Q2 this year. The signs were initially evident in certain Asian 
economies, in confi dence indicators and in the behaviour of the fi nancial markets, but in recent 
months the positive symptoms have gradually spread towards the indicators of economic activ-
ity, such as industrial production, stockbuilding and demand (exports and retail sales), and to-
wards other geographical areas (Japan, the United States and the euro area). In sum, almost 
one year after the fi nancial collapse triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the global 
economy appears to be heading towards a slow exit from recession (see Chart 2).
In the United States, GDP picked up from a negative annualised quarter-on-quarter rate of 
-6.4% in 2009 Q1 to -0.7% in Q2. Using comparable rates, growth in Europe moved from 
-9.7% to -0.5%, and in Japan the economy grew by 2.3% in Q2, following the strong fall in Q1. 
In the case of emerging Asia, the rebound has proven particularly sharp owing to the impulse 
provided by China, the impact of the various fi scal stimulus plans, stockbuilding in these econ-
omies and the resumption of capital fl ows. By contrast, in Eastern Europe the ongoing adjust-
Economic and fi nancial 
developments: external 
environment
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SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Bloomberg and JP Morgan.
a. Indices in dollars.
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ment of macroeconomic imbalances continued to bear negatively on growth. Overall, the 
brighter outlook for the world economy drove an appreciable recovery in commodities prices, 
a factor that particularly favours Latin America in its capacity as an exporting region.
The improvement on international fi nancial markets came about against the background of a 
resumed appetite for risk, as the risk of fi nancial collapse and of a prolonged depression in the 
world economy faded in light of the effectiveness of the numerous public measures to support 
the fi nancial system and activity in general. As a result, prices in some segments of the fi nan-
cial markets have regained their levels prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The Federal 
Reserve has kept its offi cial interest rate in the range of 0%-0.25%, although it has withdrawn 
some of the facilities launched during the crisis as these have progressively become unneces-
sary. The European Central Bank cut its offi cial rate on two occasions, in April and May, to 1%, 
while the Bank of Japan held its rate of 0.1%. Against this backdrop there have been signs of 
a return to relative normality, such as the slight rise in US 10-year interest rates, to around 
3.5%, and the reversal of the previous appreciation of the dollar against the main currencies of 
the emerging and developed countries, insofar as US government paper and the dollar have 
ceased to have the safe-haven status they assumed in the period of greatest fi nancial stress.
The emerging markets benefi ted particularly from these developments and have maintained 
the upward trend initiated in March (see Chart 2). Drawing on the EMBI+, sovereign spreads 
can thus be seen to have narrowed to around 340 bp, a similar level to that prior to September 
2008. By region, the EMBIs for Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia have trended very 
similarly (see Chart 2). This same favourable behaviour can be seen for stock markets, drawing 
on the MSCI indices in dollars, which have held at highs since late summer 2008.
The aggregate national accounts data1 for the region as a whole confi rm Latin America was in 
recession between 2008 Q4 (-2.5% quarter-on-quarter) and 2009 Q1 (-2.3% quarter-on-quar-
ter), following the defi nition of two consecutive quarters of decline (see Chart 3). In 2009 Q2 
there was a slight recovery (0.5% quarter-on-quarter), although this was not across the board 
since only Brazil (1.9%) and, with less intensity, Argentina (0.5%) and Colombia (0.7%) posted 
positive quarterly growth, while the other countries making up the aggregate recorded nega-
tive quarter-on-quarter rates (some of which high, as was the case with Mexico, at -1.1%). In 
year-on-year terms, activity continued to contract in Q2, to a rate of 3.9%, 2.9 pp of which are 
accounted for solely by the decline in GDP in Mexico.
The contraction in the region’s economic activity continued essentially to be refl ected in the 
decline in domestic demand, the year-on-year rate of which dipped from -3.4% in 2009 Q1 to 
-5.6% in Q2. Among the domestic demand components, the biggest adjustment was in gross 
capital formation (-14.1% year-on-year, against -9.1% in Q1; see Chart 4), which is the most 
volatile component and that which is habitually most affected directly by confi dence effects, in 
addition to changes in the availability and cost of fi nancing. The fall in investment was across 
the board, with no signifi cant differences observable between those economies that have 
proven most resilient to the crisis and those least. In particular, in Brazil, where the recession 
has been shorter and relatively shallow, the year-on-year decline in gross capital formation in 
Q2 was 17%. Meantime, in Mexico, where the adjustment is proving sharper and more pro-
tracted, it fell by 15.2%, against a background of weak foreign direct investment and despite 
the increase in public investment (almost 30%). Private consumption also fell appreciably, al-
beit less markedly so than investment, as evidenced by the year-on-year growth rates of 
Activity and demand
1. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru.
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-1.6% and -1.9% in Q1 and Q2, respectively (see Chart 4). Indeed, this is the domestic de-
mand component where the biggest differences across countries are seen: in Brazil, con-
sumption sustained positive growth rates throughout the period (1.3% and 3.2% year-on-year 
in Q1 and Q2), while in Mexico the contraction was -8.7% and -9.6% year-on-year, respec-
tively. Contributing to explaining this greater resilience of private consumption are three fac-
tors: the relatively sound behaviour of the labour market in Brazil, where the unemployment 
rate has fallen in recent months to around 8%, from 9% in March; the application of temporary 
measures offering tax incentives for car purchases; and, generally, the authorities’ success in 
easing the credit tightness derived from the international fi nancial crisis. Conversely, in Mexico, 
the series of shocks impacting the country (including the decline in remittances and swine fl u), 
its greater exposure to the United States, the sharp deterioration in its labour market and the 
relative stickiness of infl ation would help explain the collapse of this demand component. 
Government consumption was the only component to show positive growth rates in the two 
quarters (3.7% and 2.8% year-on-year; see Chart 4), although here too there are cross-coun-
try differences. In Chile, Peru and Argentina, government consumption grew at a rate of over 
6% year-on-year, while in Brazil and, above all, Mexico and Colombia, it did so at much lower 
rates.
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a. Aggregate of the seven main economies.
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In the fi rst half of 2009 there was, moreover, a notable shift in the composition of growth compared 
with the pattern of the last fi ve years; there was a positive contribution of up to 2 pp to the year-on-
year change in GDP in Q2 by external demand, as a result of the collapse in imports, and a strong-
ly negative contribution by domestic demand (see Chart 4). Since real exports continued falling at 
double-fi gures rates in the fi rst two quarters of the year (-14.2% and -12.3% year-on-year), the 
positive contribution of external demand simply refl ects the intensity of the domestic adjustment and 
its impact on imports, in real terms (-16% and -20% year-on-year, respectively). The current account 
balance, which had continued on a worsening trend since early 2007 and had moved into defi cit in 
late 2008, has begun to correct itself. Indeed, some re-balancing of current-account balances is 
taking place at the regional level, with a decline in the current surplus in some of the net creditor 
countries (Venezuela) and a reduction in the current defi cits of Brazil and Mexico (see Chart 5). As 
regards the trade balance, the pick-up in commodities prices has at least helped contain the decline 
in export in value terms since the end of last year. However, the signs of recovery are still tenuous.
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The higher-frequency supply and demand indicators, which provide more updated informa-
tion, appeared to give credence to the idea that the turning point was reached towards Q2, 
followed by some recovery in activity in recent months. Thus, for example, retail sales have 
stabilised at moderately positive growth rates (see Chart 6). The collapse in industrial produc-
tion has been checked and several months of positive growth recorded, although in year-on-
year terms it remains very weak. Conversely, the labour market indicators, which habitually lag 
the cycle, have worsened considerably. The unemployment rate for the region as a whole drew 
close to 8% of the labour force, an increase of more than 1.5 pp on the end-2008 level. Of 
note, too, is the heterogeneity across countries, since in Chile and Mexico the unemployment 
rate continued to rise in Q2, to 10.8% and 6.1% of the labour force, respectively, while in Bra-
zil, Argentina and Peru, the performance was more favourable.
Although the macroeconomic indicators for Latin America were generally negative for much of 
the last six months, fi nancial markets trended most favourably from March as a result of global 
factors and, possibly, of the resilience the banking sector has shown in Latin America in the 
Financial markets
and external fi nancing
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a. Four-quarter moving average.
b. Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven biggest economies.
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face of the fi nancial crisis. These developments have translated into an uptrend in asset prices, 
which has been virtually uninterrupted and indeed more accentuated than that of international 
markets, against a background of rising commodities prices. This trend, which suggests a 
resumption of capital fl ows, has been generalised across countries and markets (stock, debt 
and foreign exchange markets alike). This has allowed for a substantial replenishment of for-
eign currency reserves, which had fallen during the worst months of the crisis, though it has 
also aroused some concern over the potential volatility of reserves and the emergence of signs 
of overvaluation.
Against this backdrop, most exchange rates moved on an appreciating trend (see Chart 7), 
which in the case of the Brazilian real and the Colombian peso was close to 30% from April. In 
Brazil, the appreciation was the result of the improved economic outlook (the country was ac-
corded investment grade status by Moody’s), although the resumption of carry-trade opera-
tions, given the interest rate spread in place, may also have played a signifi cant role. The ap-
preciation of the Chilean and Peruvian currencies against the dollar was more moderate, at 
around 6%, but suffi cient so that reserves could be replenished in the case of Peru. In con-
trast, the Mexican peso has shown high volatility against the dollar, although its level at present 
is similar to that at the start of the half-year period, and the Argentine peso has tended to 
depreciate, albeit more moderately than during the six previous months, and has stabilised. 
The trend of exchange rates in general was suffi ciently favourable so that the authorities could 
unwind (Mexico, Peru) or that the market could cease to use (Brazil, Colombia, Chile) some of 
the dollar-denominated liquidity-provision mechanisms set in train with the crisis.
As regards the debt markets, there was a notably strong narrowing in sovereign spreads and 
in CDS, most acutely so in those countries considered as posing a higher risk in the crisis 
(Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina; see Chart 7). The sovereign spread for the region measured 
by the EMBI+ index diminished from mid-March (more than 300 bp), standing in early Octo-
ber at the levels prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (365 bp). The reduction was 
generalised across the region’s countries, although the sovereign spread that most contrib-
uted to the reduction in the EMBI+ was that of Ecuador (chiefl y for technical reasons, most 
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specifi cally the stripping out from the index of the unpaid debt of the Global 2012 and Global 
2030 bonds). The sovereign spreads of Argentina and Venezuela narrowed by around 1000 bp 
and 450 bp, respectively. In the former case, the narrowing was underpinned by the per-
ception of a change in attitude by the government towards the IMF, partly as a result of the 
general elections in late June, but also by the resolving of the issue of holdouts and the 
Paris Club. In Mexico the spread narrowed only by around 120 bp, despite the extension of 
the swap agreements with the Federal Reserve to February 2010 and the expenditure-con-
tainment measures taken by the government in the 2010 budget. Finally, the remaining coun-
tries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru) showed reductions in their sovereign spreads of be-
tween 150 bp and 200 bp. One notable aspect is the rather unfavourable behaviour of 
corporate debt spreads, as evidenced by the region’s CEMBI indices, which are currently at 
levels not too far below those at the start of the crisis in some countries (see Chart 7). That 
highlights the continuity of problems related to the refi nancing of the corporate private sec-
tor.
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Turning to stock markets, the local currency-denominated regional index (MSCI) for Latin 
America ended the period with gains exceeding 35%, a similar movement to that for other 
emerging regions and higher than for most developed countries. Across the Latin American 
countries, the main regional stock markets ended the last six months with gains. The biggest 
increases were in Argentina, with a rise of over 85%, followed by the Lima stock exchange (see 
Chart 7). In the other economies in the region, stock market indices have increased by be-
tween 30% and 40%.
Against this backdrop, domestic credit to the private sector continued to slow, in line with the 
trend followed since late 2007. But it held at a positive year-on-year growth rate, even in real 
terms, in most countries (at around 5% on average for the region). The main exception to this 
trend was Mexico, where credit to the private sector fell moderately in real terms, although the 
rate of decline appears to have stabilised in recent months (see Chart 8).
ºEXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCING
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CHART 8
SOURCES: JP Morgan, IMF and national statistics.
a. Seven biggest economies.
b. Years 2009 and 2010: IMF estimate (October 2009).
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The latest forecasts on capital fl ows show something of an upward revision, but in any event they will 
continue to be very moderate in 2009. Foreign direct investment is expected to continue to be the 
main capital fl ow towards the region ($60 billion), and there will foreseeably be a capital outfl ow of 
portfolio and banking fl ows, in net terms, for 2009 as a whole, despite their recent recovery. It is esti-
mated that the shortage of private fl ows will be offset, in part, by the increase in offi cial fi nancing, 
which would resume its levels at the beginning of the decade (see Chart 8). Overall, there should be 
a continuing net moderate fl ow towards the region in 2009. In this setting, issues on international 
markets picked up notably in the fi rst half of 2009, continuing into Q3 and the start of Q4 (with various 
sovereign debt issues such as those of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay under very fa-
vourable conditions). In the fi rst half of the year, corporate issues slightly exceeded sovereign ones, 
although they were concentrated solely in the most liquid markets, namely Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
The incipient moderating trend of infl ation rates observed in Latin America in late 2008 has 
stepped up over the course of the following months, placing the overall index at a year-on-year 
rate of 5.9% in September, i.e. 1.5 pp below the level at the beginning of the year and 2.8 pp 
below the highs reached in October 2008 (see Chart 9). Core infl ation has also trended down-
Prices and 
macroeconomic policies
INFLATION AND OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES
Year-on-year rates of change
CHART 9
SOURCES: National statistics and Banco de España.
a. Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b. Weighted average of the official rates of the five countries with inflation targets.
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wards, although initially it showed greater stickiness (6% year-on-year, 2.3 pp below its high). 
However, this moderation was less than in other emerging regions.
The decline in infl ation was marked in most of the Latin American countries, though Chile was 
a particular case in point; in August it posted a negative year-on-year rate, for the fi rst time 
since April 2004, and in September it stood at -1.1%, a low since the series began. In Peru 
and Colombia, too, the infl ation rate eased appreciably, to 1.2% and 3.2%, respectively. Ac-
cordingly, in recent months infl ation in the countries with explicit infl ation targets has stood 
within the tolerance band or, in the cases of Chile and Colombia, below the established fl oor. 
The only exception is Mexico. There, although infl ation has fallen by 1.4 pp since January 
(4.9% in September), it remains almost 1 pp above the target range ceiling. Generally, infl ation 
expectations in the fi ve countries with infl ation targets have fi rmed at rates in keeping with the 
targets set for 2009 and 2010 (see Table 2), which would denote a high degree of credibility of 
these targets and of the functioning of the monetary policy framework in these countries, 
against the background of a strong fi nancial and real shock. Elsewhere, prices showed down-
ward stickiness in Venezuela, standing at a year-on-year rate of 28.9% in September, while in 
Argentina offi cial infl ation, after having reached its lowest level since August 2004 in June, rose 
in September to 6.2%.
From a broader perspective, recent infl ation developments in Latin America help better under-
stand the relative signifi cance of two opposing factors: the pass-through effect arising from the 
sharp depreciation exchange rates underwent from September 2008 to March 2009, and the 
price-moderating impulse stemming from the opening up of output gaps in all the countries, 
as a result of the crisis. In this respect, it would seem that in most cases the fi rst factor has not 
materialised, probably owing to the fact that the depreciation has largely proved to be tempo-
rary, although the second effect would not have managed to signifi cantly reduce the core infl a-
tion rate at the regional level (see Chart 9). Among the countries with infl ation targets, Mexico 
would be the most signifi cant case since, although its infl ation has eased, it has not done so 
to the extent expected, given the widening of the output gap (the biggest in the region; see the 
section “Economic developments by country”).
In terms of components, the main factor behind the easing in consumer prices has been 
the price of food and, to a lesser extent, of energy. As Chart 9 shows, the fall in food prices 
accounts for around 80% of the decline in overall infl ation rates. This decline refl ects the 
base effects of the strong rise in commodities prices the previous year, and also the fact 
that the recovery seen in these prices since March has coincided with an appreciation of 
exchange rates. The contribution of the remaining CPI components diminished moderately, 
2008
Fulfillment Target December (a) Target Expectations (a)
Brazil Yes 4.5 ± 2 4.3 4.5 ± 2 4.4
Mexico No 3 ± 1 4.2 3 ± 1 4.4
Chile No 3 ± 1 -0.7 3 ± 1 2.6
Colombia No 5 ± 0.5 3.5 3 ± 1 4.2
Peru No 2 ± 1 1.3 2 ± 1 2.3
2010
Country
2009
INFLATION
Year-on-year rates of change
TABLE 2
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus.
a. Latinfocus, October 2009.
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despite the strong slowdown in domestic demand and the moderation in administered 
prices.2
All the central banks with infl ation targets have cut their offi cial interest rates in the past six 
months, and some introduced additional interbank liquidity support measures (see Box 1). The 
biggest cut in interest rates was in Chile (775 pp to 0.5%), followed by Colombia (600 bp to 
4%), Peru (525 bp to 1.25%), Brazil (500 bp to 8.75%) and Mexico (375 bp to 4.5%) (see Chart 
9). From the summer onwards, and with some degree of synchronisation, there was a change 
in the tone of the central banks’ communication, which pointed to the end of the cycle of rate 
cuts. In most of the countries, the reduction in nominal rates has entailed a signifi cant reduc-
tion in real interest rates (with the odd exception such as Chile). The cuts in offi cial rates have 
tended to pass through - with less intensity - to the long-term interest rates on local currency-
denominated government debt, which have fallen by between 50 bp and 200 bp, depending 
on the country. As a result, the long-term yield curves have maintained a strongly positive 
slope in general, which has been highlighted as worrying by some central banks (Chile, Brazil). 
In Mexico, long-term interest rates have proven notably reluctant to fall and are holding virtu-
ally at the same levels as six months ago.
The weakness of the recovery expected for the coming months and the appreciating trend of 
exchange rates should prevent renewed upward pressures on prices; however, the rise in 
commodities prices will also restrict the leeway for infl ation to fall. Accordingly, as the signs of 
recovery in the economy fi rm, central banks will foreseeably begin to withdraw the monetary 
stimulus. In most countries, the market is discounting offi cial rate increases as from 2010 Q1, 
increases that will be relatively signifi cant in some cases. Yet as there is a risk that in emerging 
economies such as the Latin American countries a rise in interest rates may increase fi nancial 
infl ows in the short term, it is possible that the tightening of monetary conditions may be un-
derpinned initially by other measures such as, for instance, the withdrawal of some of the ex-
traordinary liquidity-provision measures applied during the crisis (ratios, reserve requirements). 
Indeed, Brazil appears to have begun to act along these lines. In this respect, the appreciation 
of exchange rates is causing growing concern in some countries. Brazil has reintroduced its 
2% tax on cross-border transactions, while Colombia has announced the purchase of re-
serves and has suspended the repatriation of State-owned companies’ dollars.
In the fi scal policy realm, the key development was the sharp deterioration in public fi nances 
in the fi rst half of the year, which was across the board and which in most countries was due 
principally to the abrupt decline in primary revenue (-10% year-on-year in the region as a 
whole), more than to the expansion in expenditure, although this did continue to increase (see 
Chart 10). Government revenue was reduced owing to the weakness of activity, to lower com-
modities prices (see Box 2) and, in some countries, to specifi c tax cuts. In Brazil and, above 
all, in Argentina, revenue increased, but the expansion of spending was greater, giving rise to 
a reduction in the primary surplus. In the region as a whole, this translated into the emergence 
of a total defi cit of 2% (from a position of a balanced budget one year earlier) and an increase 
in public debt/GDP ratios (although this increase is comparatively lower than the increases in 
public debt occurring in the industrialised countries, as a result of the response to the crisis. A 
special case is that of the countercyclical fi scal policy pursued by Chile, harnessing the funds 
built up in previous years, which have enabled it to increase public spending in real terms by 
2. In Brazil, government-regulated prices dipped from a year-on-year rate of increase of 4.1% in April to 3.9% in August; 
in Mexico, administered prices were growing at a year-on-year rate of 6.3% in January and are now doing so at 0.8%; in 
Chile, the items that have most contributed to the slowdown in infl ation have been fi nancial charges and urban transport; 
in Colombia, the year-on-year rate of regulated prices fell from 8.5% in January to 2.5% in September.
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The monetary policy response to the crisis at global level has been 
extraordinary and unprecedented. Not only have offi cial interest 
rates been reduced to historical lows in the vast majority of coun-
tries, but also this easing has been supplemented in many ad-
vanced economies by unconventional monetary policy measures, 
such as the provision of unlimited long-term liquidity, lending to 
sectors in diffi culty and the purchase or swap of private and public 
assets. These unconventional measures were taken against a 
background of near-zero offi cial interest rates, i.e. when the leeway 
for using the traditional monetary policy instrument had been ex-
hausted.
As can be seen in the panel, these measures brought a spectacular 
increase, and change in the composition, of the balance sheets of the 
main central banks, which, in the particular case of the Federal Re-
serve and the Bank of England, more than doubled and tripled their 
size measured in terms of GDP, respectively. In the case of the emerg-
ing countries, and of Latin America in particular, there has also been 
an expansion of balance sheets (which, measured in terms of GDP, 
was larger than in the industrialised economies), although in a lesser 
proportion.
This Box analyses the increase in the balance sheets of the central 
banks of Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and the extent to which 
it was due to unconventional measures analogous or comparable to 
those taken in the advanced economies, or whether, on the contrary, 
this increase is explained by other factors specifi c to these countries, 
although also related to the impact of the crisis. The conclusions of 
the analysis support the second hypothesis.
In Mexico, the assets of the central bank increased by 9% to 13% 
of GDP between mid-2007 and mid-2009, particularly from Sep-
BOX 1THE DIFFERING RESPONSE OF LATIN AMERICAN CENTRAL BANKS TO THE CRISIS
SOURCE: Central bank balance sheets.
a. As a percentage of 2008 GDP.
b. For Chile, approximated by international reserves.
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tember 2008. This change is only partly explained by the meas-
ures taken by the Bank of Mexico to provide liquidity to the finan-
cial markets as a result of the impact of the crisis. Among the 
measures taken, mention may be made, on the assets side, of the 
exchange market interventions to sell US dollars, the creation of 
new peso-denominated liquidity facilities and the repurchase, from 
October 2007, of “savings protection bonds” by the Bank of Mex-
ico (20% of the outstanding balance of these bonds). However, a 
very significant part of the balance sheet increase (around 50%) 
can be explained by the rise in the equivalent peso value of the 
foreign exchange reserves, despite the fact that, being denomi-
nated in dollars, they were reduced by the exchange market inter-
ventions.
In the case of Brazil, the numerous central bank initiatives to provide 
liquidity in local currency and in US dollars from October 2008 did not 
have a substantial impact on the size of the central bank’s balance 
sheet, which remained around 30% of GDP (although, as a result of 
the accumulation of reserves, this had expanded strongly in the previ-
ous year). In addition, as in other countries, the balance sheet was 
affected by the reserve valuation adjustments derived from exchange 
rate fl uctuations. The measures taken by Brazil altered, however, the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet on the liabilities side, 
through the reduction and fl exibilisation of bank reserves. This led to 
a signifi cant reduction in the volume of funds compulsorily deposited 
at the central bank, both in cash and in securities, and to a simultane-
ous release of liquidity.
In the case of Chile, the central bank’s decision to strengthen its 
foreign currency position from April 2008 (months before the failure 
of Lehman Brothers) interrupted the downward trend in its balance 
sheet since the adoption of the fl oating exchange rate in 1999. Thus 
foreign exchange reserves were accumulated (from 9.8% to 15.8% 
of GDP) from April to September 2008, although the associated 
money issue was largely sterilised through the placement of central 
bank notes. From September 2008 measures were adopted to en-
sure the dollar and peso liquidity of the local fi nancial system from 
the assets side. These measures included the sale of dollars under 
repurchase agreement (swaps), the expansion of peso-denominated 
credit lines and the establishment of a term liquidity facility for grant-
ing 90-and 180-day fi xed-rate loans. In addition, the central bank 
suspended the issuance of debt securities with maturities of one 
year or more in the second half of 2009 and repurchased its own 
debt securities (in total, around 9% of the outstanding balance), in 
order to mitigate the upward pressure on interest rates at those ma-
turities, as a result of the increase in long-term Treasury issues. No-
table on the liabilities side was the sharp increase in commercial 
bank deposits with the central bank as a result of the climate of fi -
nancial instability.
Lastly, the balance sheet of the central bank of Argentina increased 
considerably to around 27% of GDP. Half of this increase is explained 
by reserve valuation effects derived from the exchange rate deprecia-
tion (since dollar-denominated reserves decreased slightly). The other 
half basically refl ects the increase in temporary advances to the Gov-
ernment and the increase in public-sector securities held by the cen-
tral bank of Argentina, in order to help provide liquidity. In this respect, 
although the central bank of Argentina’s intervention in the exchange 
market to support the peso was of a lesser amount than those of 
other central banks in the region, it took a series of measures in re-
sponse to the worsening of the crisis in September 2008. Those 
measures aimed to ensure the provision of liquidity to the markets 
both from the assets side and from the liabilities side. They included 
the lowering of foreign reserve ratios, the increased availability of li-
quidity at a fi xed interest rate and more fl exible periods for complying 
with reserve requirements.
This review of changes in balance sheet volumes and composition 
suggests that, although the measures taken by some central banks 
were extraordinary (such as the abundant provision of liquidity in dol-
lars and local currency), few can be described as “ unconventional” 
as this term is understood in the advanced economies. The meas-
ures that can be considered unconventional include the asset pur-
chases by the Banco de México (of a relatively small amount for the 
size of the debt market) and the securities repurchases by the central 
bank of Chile, although some of these measures are associated with 
fairly routine operations between central banks and Treasuries in 
Latin America. Furthermore, a signifi cant part of the increase in bal-
ance sheet size was an automatic result of valuation affects (derived 
from the increase in the local currency equivalent of foreign exchange 
reserves) resulting from exchange rate depreciation, despite the fact 
that the dollar-amount of reserves decreased during the crisis due to 
the interventions.
The difference in cause and size of the increases in the balance 
sheets of the Latin American monetary authorities compared with 
those of developed economy monetary authorities has a twofold ex-
planation. First, the size and characteristics of the fi nancial crisis were 
very different from country to country; the main problems in Latin 
America relate to a blockage of foreign currency liquidity and the in-
struments were designed to counteract this situation. Second, the 
leeway for more conventional policies had not been exhausted: on 
one hand, only in Chile had interest rates approached the zero limit; 
on the other, unlike in the industrialised countries, most of the central 
banks had used other available instruments (particularly bank re-
serves) to boost the fl ow of liquidity in the economy. Given these cir-
cumstances, the reversal of the measures taken in this period will 
foreseeably be more automatic and less complex than in the industr-
ialised economies.
BOX 1THE DIFFERING RESPONSE OF LATIN AMERICAN CENTRAL BANKS TO THE CRISIS (cont’d)
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over 20%, despite the decline in revenue of close to 35% in the fi rst half of the year. In this 
respect, it should be mentioned how the countercyclical capacity arising from the application 
of fi scal rules has renewed interest in this instrument, not only in the region but also globally. In 
several countries, however, the implementation of fi scal stimulus plans has run behind sched-
ule. Mexico has set out a new fi scal reform, which is still pending parliamentary approval, after 
its fi scal defi cit climbed to 1.7% of GDP, the worst fi gure since 1990 (see the section “Eco-
nomic developments by country”).
In recent months, trade integration processes in Latin America have continued to be “two-
speed” in the sense that, on one hand, in the Pacifi c basin, new bilateral trade agreements 
have proliferated, mainly with Asia, while on the other hand, MERCOSUR and the Andean 
Community have continued to come up against serious obstacles. Contrary to expectations, 
the change of administration in the United States has not entailed any amendment to the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, and the discussion of new environmental and labour 
clauses has been deferred until after the crisis. The initiative to use local currency in trade be-
tween Argentina and Brazil, launched in October, covers very few transactions; despite this, it 
Other economic policies
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Year-on-year changes and percentage of GDP
CHART 10
SOURCE: National statistics.
a. Deflated by the CPI.
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The region’s latest growth cycle was largely driven by the prices of com-
modities, and, among them, oil, the main export of some Latin Ameri-
can countries. This boom also signifi cantly improved the fi scal and ex-
ternal position of some countries, to the extent that, in the absence of 
fi scal and export revenue from oil, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colom-
bia and Peru would have marked external and fi scal imbalances.1
Despite this price rise, oil production and export in Latin America has 
been declining in recent years, with a few exceptions, particularly 
Brazil. The following chart shows the supply and demand for four 
large Latin American oil producers. It can be seen that, whereas the 
net exports of Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador have been falling 
sharply, the amount of oil that Brazil has to import has tended to de-
crease. This suggests that the oil reserves of some countries in the 
region are gradually being exhausted and points to the risk that some 
countries, such as Mexico, may become net importers of oil in the 
near future, while others, such as Brazil, may become exporters due 
to the discovery of new reserves in the past year.
Whether a country or region is a net exporter of oil is determined by 
the difference between the production and the domestic consumption 
of this fuel. The supply and demand depend on the existence of and 
capacity to exploit reserves, the oil extraction technology and the ef-
fort made to undertake oil exploration and extraction projects. These 
variables can be used to determine the course of future production 
and, in particular, the point of peak production, after which extraction 
decreases at a rate dependent on the age of the deposits, their phys-
ical characteristics and their exploitation profi le.2 The behaviour of 
demand is another factor to be taken into account, and one which has 
generally not received suffi cient attention when examining a country’s 
export potential. When oil prices are high, producing countries tend to 
raise their production and thus their exports. Simultaneously, however, 
the increase in domestic revenue signifi cantly stimulates economic 
growth and energy demand in the producers themselves. If, moreo-
ver, the domestic energy price is subsidised, as is customary in pro-
ducing countries, domestic demand increases all the more. 
In a situation of this type, in which the production growth rate is ex-
pected to be low or even negative, while internal demand is liable to 
grow at a notable place, net exports tend to decrease and, what is 
more, more sharply than production. Thus a country which is cur-
BOX 2THE FUTURE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS OIL EXPORTERS
SOURCES: IEA and BE calculations.
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1. Without oil revenue, Mexico’s balance of trade would be -4.8% of GDP, as 
compared with -1.1%, and its public sector balance would be -7.8%, instead 
of -0.4%, on average between 2003 and 2009. The fi gures for Venezuela would 
be a trade balance of -12% without oil, against 15.5%, and a non-oil govern-
ment defi cit of 12.8%, against -1%.
2. The fi rst studies of oil extraction limits and production peaks were by K. 
Hubbert (1956), “Energy from Fossil Fuels”, Science, who predicted that the oil 
peak would be reached in the US in 1970, as exactly occurred. The world’s 
largest oilfi elds are currently in the aforementioned stage of decline, after peak-
ing in the 1970s and 1980s (Middle East) and in 2003 (Cantarell, in Mexico). 
Only the large fi elds in the ex-Soviet union reached their peak production in the 
last three years.
BOX 2THE FUTURE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS OIL EXPORTERS (cont’d)
rently a net oil exporter will eventually become a net importer if supply 
decreases or if it increases more slowly than demand does.3 By con-
trast, countries where production is expected to rise much faster 
than demand may, sooner or later, become oil exporters. The pro-
duction and demand data published monthly by the IEA (Internation-
al Energy Agency), updated until 2009, can be used to carry out an 
illustrative exercise. It consists of projecting future exports and esti-
mating when countries will cease or start to be exporters.4
The exercise has obvious limitations, such as the automatic extrapo-
lation of production and demand growth rates from when the produc-
tion peak is reached, without taking into account possible changes in 
oil prices stimulating or discouraging new investment, changes in do-
mestic consumption subsidies, variations in global demand due to 
large new customers like China entering or leaving the market or the 
discovery of new reserves. Nor does it take into consideration chang-
es in energy effi ciency in importers or in the producers themselves 
which reduce world or domestic demand, respectively, regulatory 
changes in exporters, improvements in extraction effi ciency in declin-
ing oil fi elds or other factors.5 It should therefore be regarded merely 
as illustrative of the matter at hand, i.e. the possible exhaustion of the 
source of external funds for these Latin American countries.
The accompanying table lists the oil-producing countries in Latin 
America, divided into exporters and importers, and shows, from the 
production peak, the growth rates of production and demand. As can 
be seen, since the production peak was reached, all net exporters 
have seen a decrease in production and growth in demand, except 
Colombia, where, however, demand is decreasing more slowly than 
supply. It can be inferred from these data that all the Latin American 
countries that are currently net exporters will become net importers in 
the coming decades,6 while Brazil seems clearly set to take over from 
them as a net exporter (see panel 1 of the chart below.7
Panel 2 compares the Latin American countries with the other large 
oil exporters. The y-axis sets out the rate of change of demand from 
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From production peak to 2009
Peak date Net exports Change in supply Change in demand
NET EXPORTERS
Venezuela 1,529 98 Q1 2,884 -3.5 4.6
Mexico 646 05 Q2 1,326 -5.5 0.4
Colombia 345 98 Q4 527 -1.4 -1.2
Ecuador 288 06 Q1 362 -2.8 4.2
Trinidad and Tobago 79 06Q1 118 -7.5 4.9
Argentina 15 98 Q3 322 -2.6 1.8
NET IMPORTERS
Bolivia -24 05 Q3 -2 -6.0 6.2
Guatemala -61 03 Q2 -40 -9.2 2.3
Peru -77 93 Q4 -1 -0.6 2.4
Cuba -110 03 Q1 -100 -3.6 -0.4
Chile -351 92 Q1 -139 -7.7 5.1
Brazil -600 09 Q2 -515 7.7 0.3
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Latin America 1,678 05 Q2 3,231 -2.1 2.6
Net exports (a)
(m bpd)
SOURCES: International Energy Agency and BE calculations.
a. Mid-2007 to 2009 Q2
3. One of the clearest examples of this is Indonesia. This country reached its 
peak production in 1996 Q2, after which output fell off at an average rate of 
2.2% per year. With an increase in domestic demand of 4.6% on average, 
Indonesia became a net importer in 2002 Q3, since exports were decreasing 
at an average rate of 29.3%, much higher than the compound sum of the 
rates of change of supply and demand. A similar result would be obtained if 
production fell at a higher rate than demand, as in the United Kingdom, the 
production of which peaked in 1999 Q4 and which became a net importer fi ve 
years later, with demand stagnant (-0.02%) but an extremely sharp fall of 
-7.1% in production, which resulted in an average decrease in exports of 
44.5%. 4. The exercise does not take into account the IEA’s short-term 
(2010) or medium-term (2014) forecasts, but the qualitative conclusions are 
the same. For example, in the case of Mexico, the gap between the supply 
and demand forecast for 2010 by the IEA is narrower than that estimated us-
ing the extrapolation, i.e. Mexico would be a net importer before the date 
suggested by the exercise.
5. In the case of Colombia, for example, improved security in the country made 
it possible to exploit the potential of the oilfi elds when production seemed to 
have gone into decline. 6. For example, the IMF predicts that Mexico will be-
come a net oil importer around 2012 [see Mexico: 2008 Article IV Consultation, 
Staff Report; Staff Supplement, and Public Information Notice on the Executive 
Board Discussion, FMI (2009), and Mexico: Arrangement Under the Flexible 
Credit Line - Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Press Release on the Executive 
Board Discussion, IMF (2009)]. 7. Taken as a whole, Latin America is estimat-
ed to put on the market 1,621 million barrels in 2009 and will become a net im-
porter with a highly signifi cant change in composition; Brazil will become the 
largest exporter of the region, with 8% of total net sales, followed by Colombia, 
while Venezuela, Mexico and Chile will be the region’s largest importers. Having 
said that, the cases of Peru, Cuba and Guatemala illustrate the simplicity of the 
model since, based on the average rates from 1992 to 2009 or from 1997 to 
2009, they would also become net exporters. In Peru, the discoveries in Camisea 
have pushed the growth rate of supply from 1997 to 2009 up to 12.7%.
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the production peak and the x-axis gives the rate of change of supply 
from that time, while the size of the circles represents the current net 
exports of each country. Thus the higher and the further to the left a 
country appears on the chart and the smaller its circle, the more un-
favourable is its situation. It can be seen at Latin American countries 
are in a relatively unfavourable position with respect to other export-
ers, since they will become net importers in the near future.
Despite the limitations of the exercise, it shows that the fi scal and 
external revenue from oil exports may decrease signifi cantly over time 
for many Latin American countries. Against this background, meas-
ures taken to raise exploration and extraction effi ciency and to con-
tain the rise in demand (for example, by reducing price subsidies) 
may be vital in prolonging the period during which this revenue will be 
received.
BOX 2THE FUTURE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AS OIL EXPORTERS (cont’d)
SOURCES: IEA and BE calculations.
a. The size of the circles represents the net exports from 2007-2009; the x-axis sets out the average rate of change of supply from the 
production peak and the y-axis gives the rate of change of demand in the same period.
b. Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
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is wished to re-launch the initiative in 2010. The constituent agreement for the Single Regional 
Clearing System (SUCRE) was announced following the summit meeting of the ALBA (Bolivar-
ian Alternative for the Americas) heads of State. Lastly, Venezuela has restricted its trade with 
Colombia owing to a diplomatic confl ict (Colombian exports to Venezuela fell in July 2009 by 
more than 28%), seeking to divert its purchases to Argentina.
As regards structural reforms, there were no substantial advances in a setting in which eco-
nomic policy decisions continued to be conditioned by the crisis. In Brazil, proposals were 
made to change the arrangements for the exploitation of the new oil wells in order to grant 
greater resources to the State-owned company, Petrobras, and in Venezuela state control of 
the oil sector was reinforced with the nationalisation of related activities, and headway was 
made in the nationalisation of the steel sector. On the fi nancial integration front, Chile, Colom-
bia and Peru reached an agreement in September to integrate their equity markets in late 
2010, in an attempt to increase the volume of investment in each market and their liquidity. 
Meanwhile, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Uruguay signed the 
constituent act of the Banco del Sur, with capital of $20 billion, although to date only $7 billion 
have been subscribed.
Turning to measures adopted internationally, mention may be made of the allocation of Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs) which was concluded in late August and in early September, in compli-
ance with the G-20 decisions taken in April ($283 billion in total, $16 billion of which related to 
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the nine main Latin American economies; see Table 3). This allocation involves a reinforcement 
of international reserves (between 2% and 10% of the current stock, depending on the coun-
try) and, insofar as they are freely exchangeable for other international currencies (dollar, yen, 
sterling, euro), through voluntary agreements between governments, they entail a greater 
availability of funds for each country (between 1% and 5% of tax revenue). However, to date 
only Ecuador and Argentina have shown their readiness to exchange SDRs for other curren-
cies (Argentina, in principle, with the aim of repaying maturing short-term debt).
The contraction in economic activity that began in Brazil in 2008 Q4 ran into 2009 Q1, al-
though the scale of the quarter-on-quarter decline eased, moving from -3.4% to -1%. The 
year-on-year fall in the economy in Q1 was 1.8%, the result of a decline in domestic demand 
(which subtracted 1.9 pp from growth), in particular in investment. In Q2, GDP expanded by 
1.9% compared with the previous quarter (falling by 1.2% year-on-year), although the fall in 
domestic demand was similar to that of the previous quarter in year-on-year terms (-1.7%, 
against -1.9% in Q1) and private consumption quickened notably (from 1.3% to 3.2%). The 
positive contribution of external demand to growth was 0.3 pp in the fi rst half of the year, the 
lowest among the economies in the region. The indicators for 2009 Q3 suggest that growth in 
the economy has continued during this period. This pick-up in activity has been underpinned 
by a countercyclical monetary policy, through offi cial interest-rate cuts (a total of 500 bp since 
January, to a 8.75%, the lowest level under the current monetary framework) and through 
promoting the activity of public commercial banking and of development banking. Monetary 
easing has progressively fed through to market interest rates and this, combined with the re-
ductions in bank reserve requirements to ease banks’ liquidity tensions during 2008 Q4, has 
contributed to making bank credit notably cheaper. The easing of monetary policy was pos-
sible due to the ongoing moderation in infl ation, against the background of the weakening of 
the economy, so that the infl ation rate stood at 4.3% in September, 0.1 pp below the central 
bank target for this year (although the base effects stemming from the high increases in food 
prices in the fi rst half of 2008 also contributed to this result). On the fi scal front, public fi nanc-
es worsened notably as a result of the reduction in revenue and the increase in spending, 
meaning that the primary surplus in the twelve months to August accounted for 1.6% of GDP, 
far below the 2008 fi gure of 3.7% and the revised target for 2009, namely 2.5%. The deterio-
ration in public fi nances, combined with the appreciation of the real and with the contraction 
in GDP, contributed to the increase in (net) public debt, which stood at 44.1% in August 
(against 38.8% in December 2008). As regards the external sector, there was a slight reduc-
Economic developments 
by country
General allocation
SDRs
Special allocation
SDRs
% allocation of
tax revenues
% allocation of 
international foreign
exchange reserves
Argentina 2,454 207 3.1% 5.8%
Brazil 3,520 434 1.0% 1.9%
Colombia 897 79 1.5% 4.0%
Chile 992 94 2.4% 4.6%
Ecuador 350 49 2.9% 12.7%
Mexico 3,655 350 1.6% 5.5%
Peru 740 71 3.5% 2.5%
Uruguay 355 25 4.6% 5.1%
Venezuela 3,083 399 4.5% 11.5%
Latin America 16,046 1,708 1.8% 4.0%
SDR ALLOCATION 
$m
TABLE 3
SOURCES: Datastream and IMF.
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tion in the current account defi cits, owing to the slight rise in the balance on trade and to the 
lower defi cit on the income and services balance. The rapid recovery in the economy is one of 
the main factors behind Moody’s upgrading Brazilian sovereign debt to investment grade (see 
Chart 11).
In the fi rst two quarters of 2009, economic activity in Mexico contracted signifi cantly, with year-
on-year declines of -8% and -10.3%, respectively, although in quarter-on-quarter rates the fall 
in Q1 was much greater (-5.8%, against -1.1% in Q2). Activity was further affected in Q2 by 
swine fl u, which is expected to have subtracted 1 pp from growth. The weight of the adjust-
ment fell on domestic demand, which contracted by -8.9% and -11.7% year-on-year in Q1 
and Q2, respectively, with a notable decline in private consumption exceeding -9%. The con-
tribution of external demand was positive, albeit in a setting where both imports and exports 
fell substantially. The higher-frequency data for Q3 would point to positive quarterly growth 
rates of economic activity being resumed. The infl ation rate has fallen, albeit to a lesser extent 
than in other countries in the region, especially if regard is had to the size of the output gap 
that has arisen in recent quarters. Infl ation in September stood at 4.9%, 0.9 pp above the 
central bank’s maximum range. Infl ation expectations continue to exceed the targets set for 
2009 and 2010, and wage settlements are expected to be running at over 4%. Among the 
explanatory factors of this downward stickiness are the sharp depreciation of the peso (20% 
BRAZIL, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA
SOURCES: Central Bank of Mexico, Central Bank of Venezuela.
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since October), which has proved more persistent than in other countries and which has been 
refl ected in a rise in merchandise prices3; the high degree of hysteresis in infl ation when it 
stems from an exchange rate shock4; and the lack of competition in certain markets. Further-
more, the foreseeable rise in taxes may entail a further rise in the infl ation rate in the coming 
months. Despite these relatively unfavourable developments (see Chart 11), the central bank 
continued on the path of offi cial interest-rate cuts until the July monetary policy meeting, when 
it signalled the end of the cycle of cuts, which have totalled 375 bp since January 2009. Turn-
ing to the external sector, the current account balance in the fi rst half of 2009 posted a defi cit 
40% lower than the related period in 2008. The trade balance moved into surplus in 2009 Q2 
owing to the increase in the value of oil exports. Public fi nances worsened substantially in the 
fi rst half of the year, moving from a virtually balanced budget in 2008 (-0.1% of GDP) to a 
defi cit of -1.7%, the worst fi gure since 1990. However, one of the challenges facing the coun-
try is fi scal consolidation; the government has unveiled two government expenditure-cutting 
plans for 2009 equivalent to 0.7% of GDP, and the 2010 budget provides for further spending 
cuts and tax changes which, following Parliamentary discussion, will probably involve rises in 
excise duties, in VAT and in the top rates of personal income tax.
In Argentina, GDP in 2009 Q2 grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.3%, compared with 0.1% 
in Q1. According to these fi gures, the Argentine economy would only have posted a decline in 
quarterly terms in 2008 Q4 (-0.5%), thus avoiding the situation of technical recession. In year-
on-year terms, the economy recorded a decline of -0.8% in Q2, the fi rst since 2002, following 
growth of 2% in Q1. The key feature was the fall-off in domestic demand, which declined by 
-4.8% year-on-year in Q2. In terms of components, the fall in investment totalled 10.7%, and 
that in private consumption -1.8%. The external sector made a positive contribution to growth 
of close to 4.1 pp, compared with 2 pp in 2009 Q1 as the contraction in imports deepened 
and exports picked up, partly because they benefi ted from a positive base effect. The current 
account surplus increased notably in the fi rst half of 2009 thanks to the bigger trade surplus. 
As a result of this, reserves did not fall signifi cantly despite the fact that the fi nancial account 
posted a much bigger defi cit, linked to foreign asset formation. Capital outfl ows were higher 
than $8.6 billion in the fi rst half of 2009 and have topped $43 billion since mid-2007, although 
the latest data would suggest they have been checked. Infl ation (offi cially 6.2% in September) 
fell in line with economic activity, although it remains high.5 Set against the greater demand for 
pesos in the last two months, the central bank cut its seven-day repo interest rate by 150 bp 
between July and October to 9.5%, which has translated into a signifi cant decline in market 
rates, and it began to repurchase reserves. With regard to public fi nances, the primary surplus 
fell notably in the fi rst nine months of the year, since spending grew to a much greater extent 
than revenue. There has also been a deterioration in the fi nances of the provinces. This public 
fi nances situation and the fi nancing diffi culties of the Argentine government have meant that 
only a small part of the fi scal stimulus plan announced at the end of 2008 has been imple-
mented. Likewise on the fi scal front, the government conducted another debt exchange which 
3. According to the Bank of Mexico survey, 87% of companies said that their costs had increased due to the exchange 
rate movement, owing to the fact that a large proportion of the imports they use are either directly imported (39%) or are 
tradeable goods whose domestic prices are also affected by the exchange rate. The same survey indicates that 28% of 
the companies affected opted to raise prices in light of the depreciation of the peso, and, of these, more than 50% did 
so in the fi rst half of 2009. 4. Past evidence suggests that the resumption of low infl ation rates following an episode of 
strong exchange-rate depreciation in the country is slow. Following the 35% devaluation of the peso against the dollar in 
December 1994, infl ation did not return to levels comparable with previous rates until May 1998, some 40 months later, 
while the 37% September 1976 devaluation gave rise to higher-than-previous infl ation rates for over 27 months. None-
theless, some recent papers demonstrate that the pass-through has tended to lessen (see Devereaux and Yetman (2003) 
and, for Mexico, Sidaoui and Ramos Francia (2008). 5. After more than two and a half years during which the measure-
ment of infl ation has been questioned, the government is seeking to take measures to improve the credibility of the Ar-
gentine Statistics Institute, including the creation of two advisory boards that will assess the agency’s fi gures and meth-
odologies.
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had a level of acceptance of 76% and which involved exchanging infl ation-indexed debt for 
debt indexed to a market interest rate. According to government fi gures, the exchange entails 
a saving of almost $2 billion to 2012 in debt service, at the cost of a longer repayment period. 
In recent months there has been a perceptible change in the government’s attitude towards 
the IMF, in particular regarding the revision of article 4, the fi rst since 2006, the resolution of 
holdouts - where the reopening of the debt exchange has already been announced - and the 
Paris Club.
In Chile, GDP contracted by 2.3% and 4.5% year-on-year, respectively, in the fi rst two quarters 
of 2009. However, although 2009 Q2 is the fourth consecutive quarter to post a negative 
quarter-on-quarter fi gure, there has been an easing in this rate to -0.4%. The decline in domes-
tic demand was due chiefl y to investment in machinery and equipment, although private con-
sumption also contracted. Conversely, the positive contribution of external demand amounted 
to 6.6 pp in the fi rst half of 2009, the biggest among the region’s economies, as a result of a 
much greater fall in imports than in exports. The higher-frequency data for Q3 would suggest 
that Chile has emerged from the technical recession, and is expected to post positive growth 
in quarter-on-quarter terms. As regards the external sector, the current account balance moved 
into surplus in 2009 Q1, widening in Q2 to 2.9% of GDP. The income balance showed a 
smaller defi cit, as the reduction in the prices of mining products affected the profi ts accruing 
to foreign investment in this sector. Foreign direct investment in the fi rst half of the year amount-
ed to $6.23 billion, a year-on-year decline of 20%, although it was at a peak in 2008. In the fi rst 
half of 2009, the central government balance showed a defi cit equivalent to 2.6% of total GDP 
for 2009. This resulted from the fact that real revenue fell by 34.6% year-on-year (revenue relat-
ing to the copper prices fell by almost 90%) and real expenditure grew by 18.1%. On offi cial 
fi gures, 58.4% of the fi scal stimulus plan envisaged for 2009 is estimated to have been imple-
mented in this fi rst half of the year. To fi nance this plan, the government decided to withdraw 
$4.38 billion from the sovereign fund and announced that the Treasury would issue bonds on 
the local market for the equivalent of $1.7 billion in the second half of 2009. Infl ation continued 
to fall sharply, meaning that the CPI in September stood at a year-on-year rate of -1.1%. Be-
hind this development lie the abrupt decline in domestic demand since late 2008, the high 
basis for comparison of the previous year, the swift pass-through of lower international prices 
and the change in the CPI measurement methodology which the Chilean statistical agency 
implemented in early 2009. The central bank continued cutting its offi cial interest rate (775 bp 
were shaved off from January to July), taking it to 0.5%, and it announced certain measures 
intended to infl uence the level of long-term interest rates (see Box 1).
There was a slight recovery in the Colombian economy, which expanded at a quarter-on-
quarter rate of 0.3% and 0.7% in Q1 and Q2, respectively, although compared with the same 
period a year earlier, the growth rate was slightly negative in the two quarters (-0.4% and 
-0.5%, respectively). The slight pick-up in GDP in the fi rst half of the year arose partly from the 
improvement in net external demand, owing to the decline in imports, with domestic demand 
remaining generally weak, particularly private consumption. The indicators of activity that have 
been released would suggest a persistence at the start of Q3 of the weakness dating back to 
before the global fi nancial crisis. Against this background, infl ation fell strongly from 8% at end-
2008 to 3.2% in September, below the central bank’s target range (5% + 0.5%) for the fourth 
month running. The infl ation target for 2010 has been revised downwards to 3% with an inter-
val of + 1%. The central bank, which was the fi rst in the region to initiate cuts in offi cial interest 
rates in December 2008, continued to lower them, placing them at 4.5% in June (a cumulative 
cut of 550 bp). It kept these rates unchanged at the subsequent meetings until September, 
when it unexpectedly announced a fresh cut of 50 bp to 4%. The current account defi cit eased 
in the fi rst half of the year as a result of the narrowing of the income and services defi cit, and 
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it was amply covered by long-term fi nancial infl ows. Tense relations with Venezuela pose the 
risk of reduced exports and probably contributed to the strong decline in August. On the fi scal 
front, revenue was lower than expected. In these circumstances the government has opted to 
maintain expenditure and revise the defi cit objective for 2009 upwards to 4% (from 3.7% pre-
viously); the consolidated public sector objective rises from 2.4% to 2.6% of GDP.
In Peru, the economy was in recession in the fi rst half of the year, as indicated by the quarter-
on-quarter declines of 1.1% and 0.9% in the fi rst two quarters of the year. In year-on-year 
terms, there was a negative rate of change (of -1.1%, the fi rst since 2001 Q2) only in Q2, due 
to the collapse of domestic demand (-5.5%), whose source is the fall in private investment. 
The contribution of the external sector was positive (3.7 pp in the fi rst half of the year). There 
was a current account surplus of 0.1% of GDP in 2009 Q2, following the defi cit recorded in the 
fi ve previous quarters, in light of the higher trade surplus and the lower income defi cit attribut-
able to the lower amounts of mining companies’ profi ts transferred abroad. The ongoing re-
duction in infl ation has become more accentuated in recent months, and in the fi rst nine 
months of 2009 infl ation for the year stood at -0.08%. Although core infl ation has fallen, the 
main explanatory factor here is food prices. In this setting, the central bank continued cutting 
its offi cial interest rate, shaving off a total of 525 bp from February to August to take it to 
1.25%. Nonetheless, the monetary authority has indicated that it does not envisage further 
cuts. In the fi scal arena, the non-fi nancial public sector posted a primary surplus of 1.8% of 
GDP (5.4% in the same period in 2008) in the fi rst seven months of the year. Further, there has 
been a delay in the implementation of the fi scal plan announced at the end of 2008, because 
the regional governments are not making public investments at the rates envisaged. In Sep-
tember, Moody’s upgraded Peru’s rating to investment grade.
There was a year-on-year contraction of 2.4% in economic activity in Venezuela in 2009 Q2, 
due especially to the contraction in private consumption and investment. As can be seen in 
Chart 11, the public sector has been the driving force of growth over the last eight quarters. 
The current account balance was once again in surplus in Q2, thanks to the increased value 
of exports (where oil-related products accounted for 94% of the total) and the reduction in 
imports. Infl ation remains very high (28.9% in September), partly as a result of the effects of the 
rise in VAT (3 pp in April). In more structural terms, the diffi culty in obtaining foreign currency 
on the regulated market explains part of the infl ationary tensions, and government policy con-
tinues seeking to focus on closing the gap between the offi cial and parallel exchange rates. 
There was an easing in monetary policy, with successive cuts in the top interest rates for 
credit and the minimum rates for deposits, and in legal reserve requirements in domestic cur-
rency, but this did not translate into increases in lending. On the fi scal front some tightening is 
discernible, since public spending in real terms contracted to a greater extent than revenue. 
Finally, in the policy fi eld, the government reactivated its nationalisations plan and issued a 
series of laws reinforcing its control over the oil, petrochemical and steel industries, in addition 
to fi nalising the acquisition of the Banco de Santander subsidiary.
23.10.2009.
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